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IN THE AFTERMATH OF REPUBLICAN PARTY OF
MINNESOTA V. WHITE, STATE JUDICIAL
CANDIDATES ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO WHAT
REMAINS PROTECTED
Leigh A. Leonard'
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard
the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the
influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily
give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection,
have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community .... Periodical appointments,
however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some
way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence. If the
power of making them was committed ... to the people, or to
persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be
too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance
that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the
laws.'
Democratic principles of government insist on protecting the right of
the individual to cast an informed vote for the candidate of one's choice
in a popular election The First Amendment to the Constitution
guarantees that Congress shall make no law abridging a person's
freedom of speech,3 and the Fourteenth Amendment extends that
protection to prevent infringement by the states. The courts have
vigorously guarded the freedom of speech in the context of political
J.D. Candidate, May 2004, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 500, 502 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library
ed., 2000). The framers envisioned the harms that would arise from popularly elected
judges. See id.
2. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 290-
93 (2002) (discussing the problem of an uninformed electorate, particularly on the issue of
judicial candidates, due to the restrictions on judicial candidate speech).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech.").
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (extending the protection of speech under the First
Amendment to apply in instances of state abridgement of the right to speak freely).
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elections in order to protect the most fundamental element of our
democracy, the right to vote.' Courts have placed consistent emphasis on
the value of public debate for the promotion of an educated electorate. 6
Presently, almost four-fifths of the states choose to select judges
through various forms of public elections.7 State constitutions began
instituting electoral systems of judicial selection in 1832 to counter the
heightened abuse of unchecked judicial power and to prevent the use of
judgeships in the patronage system.8 From the beginning, judges were
recognized as performing a different function than other elected
officials.9 Judges are required to be impartial about the parties and issues
5. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976). The Court has emphasized that
the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment has been the protection of speech in the
arena of political exchange:
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such
political expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."
Id. at 14. In addition to the breadth of the First Amendment's protection of speech, the
Court articulated the connection between open public discourse and the individual's right
to cast an educated vote: "In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the
identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation." Id. at 14-15. Because the electoral process was created with the understanding
that the electorate would possess the information necessary to select capable officials, the
right to vote inherently requires that access to candidate information be uninhibited. See
id.
6. See, e.g., id. at 14-15; Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 222-23 (1989) (following Buckley v. Valeo and reiterating that the Court has
repeatedly acknowledged the importance of open debate on the qualifications of
candidates under an elected democracy); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)
(addressing the First Amendment's protection of political discourse, the Court stated that,
"[t]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that [First] Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes
discussions of candidates .... .
7. PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 9 (1990). Thirty-nine states subject some, if not all, of
their appellate and trial court judges to some form of election. Id.
8. Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of
an Elected Judiciary 1846-1860, 45 THE HISTORIAN 337-54 (1983).
9. The Way Forward: Lessons from the National Symposium on Judicial Campaign
Conduct and the First Amendment, 35 IND. L. REV. 649, 652 (2002). The symposium
outlined several principles including the idea that judicial elections differ from ordinary
political elections because of the distinct role of judges. Id. The role of judges, in contrast
to the roles of elected legislators and executives, stems from three characteristics of
judicial office: 1) the judicial process focuses on "due process rights and the rule of law;"
2) the separation of powers insulates judges from electoral accountability and makes them
"responsible for most principled decision-making;" and 3) the present state judicial
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before them in courts of law and, at times, are required to choose a route
that runs contrary to popular opinion."° Justice Scalia identified judges as
being representatives of the law." As a representative of the law and not
of the people, the task of a judge inherently differs from that of all other
elected officials.12 As a representative of the law and an impartial trier of
fact, a judge must sit before the litigants in a case without bias as to the
parties and issues before him. 3
In order to serve the litigants' interests in an impartial judiciary and
the populous' desire to hold judges accountable, the Minnesota
legislature created a code to govern the conduct of the judiciary. 4 The
Minnesota Code and its American Bar Association (ABA) counterpart,
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, include guidelines for the
political activities of judges." The Minnesota Code Canon 5 states: "A
candidate . . . shall not: make pledges or promises of conduct in office
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office [or] announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.
selection process, viewed in an historical light, with a high level of electoral control,
contradicts the original state intention for the judiciary. Id.
10. Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1180 (1989) (discussing Scalia's views on judicial activism and principles of
interpretation). Scalia recognizes the importance of a judge's ability to stand up to the
traditionally dominant will of the people in order to abide by the dictates of the law. Id.
11. Chisolm v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410-11 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Excluding
judges from the plain meaning of the word representative, Justice Scalia defined a
representative as a person who is both elected by the people and acts on behalf of the
people. Id. Judges, although they may be elected, are not representatives of the people
because they represent the law, which often requires them to "rule against the People."
Id. at 411.
12. The Way Forward, supra note 9; see Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 803-04 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between the functions of
judges and other officials elected by the people, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
"[u]nlike their counterparts in the political branches, judges are expected to refrain from
catering to particular constituencies or committing themselves on controversial issues.
13. MCFADDEN, supra note 7, at 71 (explaining that some critics would interpret a
judge's impartiality to include a necessary independence from his own personal "moral,
social or political views" in the process of judicial decisionmaking).
14. See MINN. CT. R., MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2003) [hereinafter MINN.
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT] (stating, in the Preamble, the underlying purpose for the
Code). In order to build consensus among state constitutional delegates, the supporters of
judicial elections proposed other constitutional restraints to limit the politicization of the
judiciary. See Hall, supra note 8, at 352. Examples of state constitutional restraints on the
elected judiciary include: staggered judicial elections to prevent a massive judicial
turnover; fixed terms of office; and prohibiting sitting judges from campaigning for other
elected offices. Id.
15. See generally MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2003); MODEL CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT (1990).
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.. ,,16 In order to preserve the impartiality of the judiciary throughout
the electoral process, the codes prohibit judicial candidates from making
"promises and pledges"'' 7 as to their conduct while in office (hereinafter
referred to as the promise and pledge clause), and from announcing their
personal opinions on disputed legal or political issues (hereinafter
referred to as the announce clause). 8
The limits on judicial candidate speech debated in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White were promulgated by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota based on the 1990 Amendments to the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct.' 9 The Code evolved from the Model Canons of
Judicial Ethics-first formulated in 1924.20 These Canons recommended
general ethical principles for the governing of judicial activities. 21 The
Model Canons were reformulated to become the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct in 1972.22 The current version of the Model Code, revised in
16. MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5 (A)(3)(d)(i) (1996). Similarly, the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5 states:
[A] candidate.., shall not: make pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; make
statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court ....
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(3)(d)(i-ii) (1990). The Model Code revision to
the announce clause was instituted in 1990. Id.; see also Republican Party of Minn. v.
Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 973 (D. Minn. 1999). The Minnesota Code's announce clause
was originally modeled after the Model Code of 1972 announce clause, which states: "[A]
candidate . .. should not ... announce his views on disputed legal or political issues ......
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1972). Announce clauses modeled
after the 1972 Code were at issue in Republican Party v. White, but now, presumably, all
state codes drafted with a likeness to Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i-ii) of the Model Code will be
unconstitutional on the grounds of the Court's holding in Republican Party v. White. See
Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School, et al. at 3,
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521) (asserting the
equivalence of the Minnesota Code Canon 5 and the ABA Model Code Canon 5).
17. MINN. CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i).
18. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
19. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 973 (D. Minn. 1999)
(explaining -that the Minnesota Supreme Court refrained from adopting the exact
language of the ABA Model Code, as it was amended in 1990).
20. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association at 6-7, Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521) (recounting the history of the ABA
Model Code, including the original form of the announce clause dictating "that a
candidate for judicial office 'should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on
disputed issues to secure class support"'). See also MODEL CANONS OF JUD. CONDUCT
Canon 30 (1924).
21. See LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 9
(1992) (citing to the Preamble of the Model Canons of Judicial Conduct, written in 1924,
to demonstrate the purpose delineated in the original Canons).
22. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (1972) (revising the Model Canons of 1924 in
light of issues facing the modern judiciary).
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1990, concretely addresses the issues and concerns emerging in judicial
politics.2 The 1990 Code of Judicial Conduct amends the announce
clause of the 1972 Code with a prohibition against candidate statements
that either commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies, or issues that may arise before the candidate if
elected to the court .2  Additionally, the 1990 Code maintains the promise
and pledge clause laid out in the 1972 Code.25 The ABA clearly identifies
the objective of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct as the maintenance
of an independent judiciary and the preservation of the honor and
respect for the judicial office. 2' The 1990 revisions to the Model Code,found in Canon 5, were intended to reflect the American Bar
23. MILORD, supra note 21, at 9. The Preamble to the Model Code emphasizes the
functionality of text as it is applied to judicial and political conduct:
The new Preamble makes clear that because of their independent role in the
American legal system, judges must act in a manner that maintains public
confidence in that system .... Its purpose ... is to set forth basic, enforceable
standards for all judges and to assist them in establishing and maintaining high
standards in their judicial and extra-judicial conduct.
Id. Canon 5 of the Model Code is entitled "A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain
from Inappropriate Political Activity." MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5 (1990).
This Canon elaborates on the specific activities associated with a judge's own election or a
judge's support of another public official. See id.
24. See MILORD, supra note 21, at 50-51 (highlighting the change from a prohibition
on announcements to a prohibition on statements of commitment). Furthermore, Milord
explains that the alteration in the present code creates continuity with Canon 3(B)(9),
which provides a rule governing public comment by sitting judges for matters still pending.
Id. at 51.
25. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCr Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)(1990) (stating
"[a] candidate for judicial office ... shall not: make pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office"), with
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7(C)(1972) (recommending that a candidate
"should make no pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the judicial duties of the office...").
26. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (1990). The Preamble sets forth the
principles of the American justice system, the role of the judiciary, the intention of the
Code, and the clear purpose of maintaining an independent and impartial judiciary:
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and
competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The role of
the judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and the rule of law.
Intrinsic to all sections of this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and
collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive
to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system. The judge is an arbiter
of facts and law for the resolution of disputes and highly visible symbol of
government under the rule of law.
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Association's concern for the constitutionality of the restrictions on
judicial candidate speech."
The Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct and the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct set out to preserve the appearance of an impartial
judiciary, as it was intended by the framers] 8 Additionally, the Preamble
to the Model Code confirms that the canons of judicial conduct should be
enforced in accordance with the Constitution. 2' The First Amendment to
the United States Constitution has traditionally protected political
speech from any form of encroachment. 0 In one case, Gregory Wersal, a
candidate for the Minnesota judiciary, filed a suit in federal court seeking
a judgment declaring that the announce clause of the Minnesota Judicial
Code violated the First Amendment." Wersal claimed that the announce
clause limited his ability to speak candidly on political issues while vying
for the votes of the general electorate.32
The United States Supreme Court held that the portion of the
announce clause of Minnesota's Canon 5, which prohibited judicial
candidates from announcing their views as to political or legal issues,
violated the First Amendment.33 Applying the strict scrutiny test to the
speech limitation, the Court held that it need not decide whether a state's
interest in maintaining an impartial judiciary is compelling because the
Minnesota Code's announce clause failed to be narrowly tailored to the
purported state interest in impartiality34 The Court's holding decided a
controversial issue among several of the federal circuits, but left it up to
the various state supreme courts to decide the exact type of speech that
27. MILORD, supra note 21, at 44-50 (explaining how the debate over the revised
language and the concern over the constitutionality of the clauses led the ABA to narrow
the language of the Code to avoid free speech challenges).
28. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (1990); see also Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 365 U.S. 765, 775-76 (2002) (recognizing the State's contention, in
accordance with the Model Code, that an interest in an impartial judiciary is compelling).
29. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (1990) ("[The Canons] should be
applied consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules and
decisional law....").
30. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (explaining that the First
Amendment, enforced against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, especially
protects the open discussions of candidates and matters respecting the political process);
Cf. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971) (stating that if the First
Amendment's purpose was to encourage an open forum for the generation of novel ideas,
then the First Amendment's most important application is to the electoral process).
31. White, 536 U.S. at 768-70 (seeking to estop the State of Minnesota from infringing
on his right to free and open debate of issues during his campaign for election to the
judiciary).
32. Id. at 769-70.
33. Id. at 788.
34. Id. at 776.
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will be construed as permissible under the now defunct announce
clause.3 5
In light of the Court's finding that the announce clause of the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct was unconstitutionally broad in its
capture of political speech, this Note examines the open question of
whether the promise and pledge clause of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct and similar state codes violates the First Amendment. Section I
discuses the formation of the codes of judicial conduct, their underlying
purpose, and the conflict that has arisen between the codes and a judicial
candidate's First Amendment rights. Section II details the issue that
emerged in the Supreme Court's decision of Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White. Section III addresses the Supreme Court's ruling in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and the various opinions of the
Court, which articulated three distinct concerns: the state systems of
judicial elections, which favor accountability; the rights of a judicial
candidate to protection of his political speech; and the underlying right of
a litigant to an impartial jurist. Given the various opinions of the Court
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Section IV attempts to
reconcile whether the Court could ever find an appropriate balance
between accountability, free speech, and impartiality under one of the
current modes of judicial selection employed either on the state or the
federal level. This Note analyzes, based on the Court's rejection of the
announce clause, whether the promise and pledge clause is
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny. This Note concludes that, under
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, state tribunals will be forced to
examine the alternatives for promoting an impartial judiciary and
retaining judicial elections in order to curtail the infringement on speech
perpetuated by the current judicial codes of conduct. Among the
considerable options, the most viable for achieving the states' interest in
an impartial judiciary-while balancing the speech interest of candidates
and the rights of litigants-may be for the states to follow the model
employed by the Constitution for the federal judiciary.
I. THE DEVELOPING CONFLICT BETWEEN POLITICAL SPEECH AND
JUDICIAL ETHICS
A. The Model Codes Matured With an Eye on Strict Scrutiny
The Model Canons of Judicial Ethics were originally drafted in 1924 as
an initial and formal attempt to regulate judicial ethics.36 Although the
35. Marcia Coyle, New Suits Foreseen on Judicial Elections, NAT'L L. J., July 8, 2002,
at Al.
36. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, at 6, Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (01-521).
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code discouraged candidates from making conclusions of law in order to
secure electoral support,37 the code did not prohibit speech on political
issues, as long as candidates did not make their political party affiliation1 8
obvious. The first overhaul of the Model Canons took place nearly
fifty years after the promulgation of the original.39 The Model Code of
Judicial Conduct that emerged in 1972 had a renewed focus on the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary. 40 The most recent
revision of the Model Code, formulated in 1990, resulted in changes that
were intended to narrow the prohibitory language of the announce
clause to withstand a First Amendment challenge.4' The current Model
Code employs new language in the announce clause, but maintains the
old language of the promise and pledge clause.42
37. MODEL CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 30 (1923). Canon 30 states:
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to make for
him, promises of conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices of
the appointing or electing power; he should not announce in advance his
conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do
nothing while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will
administer his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
Id. This original Canon served as the foundation for future Canons to include a
prohibition against political speech. See id.; see also MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
(1998).
38. MODEL CANONS OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 28 (1924) (permitting judges to hold
their own political views, yet prohibiting them from publicly advocating on behalf of a
political party, except when necessary, for the promotion of their own electoral interests).
39. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, at 6, White (01-512). The
1972 Code was the product of laborious consideration and numerous stages of revising,
beginning in October of 1969 and culminating in May of 1972. E. WAYNE THODE,
REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 42 (1973).
40. THODE, supra note 39, at 45; see contra Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar
Association, at 5, White (01-512) (finding the 1972 revisions to contain many of the same
basic ideals for judicial conduct as the original Canons of 1924).
41. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, at 8, White (01-512)
(recognizing the opportunity for conflict between the announce clause of the 1972 Model
Code, the Minnesota Supreme Court revised the language in the 1990 Model Code to
sustain First Amendment challenges).
42. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (1990) (stating
that a candidate "shall not: make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of office"), with MODEL CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (1972) (stating that a candidate "should not make pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office").
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B. The Clash Between State Election Oversight and the First Amendment
• 43
States maintain broad power to regulate their general elections. Yet
that power "does not extinguish the State's responsibility to observe the
limits established by the First Amendment rights of the state's citizens.""
In Mills v. Alabama,4' the Supreme Court held that political campaign
speech deserves the utmost protection under the First Amendment.4 6
The First Amendment has special meaning in the context of governmentaffars ad cadida  " 47
affairs and candidate discourse. In a democracy, the right of citizens to
make informed decisions about candidates for political office is
fundamental to the electoral process.48 In Buckley v. Valeo49 the Court
emphasized that "[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates [is] integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution. '"5' The Court stressed the
importance of an informed democratic citizenry in order for citizens to
make conscious leadership choices-to guide the nation or locality in
accordance with the public will.
51
Although political speech is highly protected, situations may arise in
which a legitimate need entitles a state to encroach on the First
Amendment right to speech.52 In Brown v. Hartlage, the Court examined
43. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (explaining
that Article I, Section IV of the United States Constitution entrusts the states with the
responsibility of designating the time, place, and manner for the elections of
representatives to the Federal government and state officers).
44. Id.
45. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
46. See id. (finding that the preservation of an open dialogue on matters of
government and political candidates is one of the central purposes of the First
Amendment).
47. See id. at 219; see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971)
(stating that, if the First Amendment's purpose is to encourage an open forum for the
generation of novel ideas, then surely the First Amendment's most important application
is to the electoral process).
48. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (addressing whether limitations on
campaign spending impermissibly limited access to information on candidates and issues).
49. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
50. Id. at 14-15 (protecting one's freedom of political expression with respect to the
system of government chosen by the founders is the intrinsic purpose of the First
Amendment); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 (1982) ("The free exchange of
ideas provides special vitality to the process traditionally at the heart of American
constitutional democracy-the political campaign.").
51. See Valeo, 424 U.S. at 15 (1976). The Court expanded on the importance of an
informed electorate to the democratic system stating, "In a republic where the people are
sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for
office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the
course that we follow as a nation." Id.
52. See Brown, 456 U.S. at 55 (explaining that the First Amendment protection of
speech does not extend to illegal agreements merely because they take the form of words).
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a Kentucky statute that sought to limit candidate speech and found that
if the statute were applied narrowly under circumstances in which speech
conflicted with another right, the state could properly limit candidate
speech. 3 In Brown, a candidate's illegal agreements and fraudulent
statements, although they took the form of speech, were not deserving of
protection under the First Amendment.54
States, such as Tennessee, successfully have asserted the right to curb
political speech when the right to free speech interferes with the right to
vote-free and independent of intimidation.55 In Burson v. Freeman,56
the Court held that "a State has a compelling interest in protecting voters
from confusion and undue influence., 57 Additionally, the Court found a
compelling interest in protecting the "integrity and reliability" of the
election process. 8 In analyzing the second prong of the strict scrutiny
test, the Court in Burson found that limiting campaign activity within a
reasonable area surrounding a polling place directly promotes the right
to vote.59
Additionally, the First Amendment is not absolute, and the Court has consistently found
limits to the First Amendment in other arenas of speech, including obscenity. E.g., Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (finding obscenity to consitute an unprotected form of
speech).
53. See id. The Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act prohibits candidates "from making
expenditure[s], loan[s], agreement[s], or contract[s] as to action[s] if elected, in
consideration for voter[s]." Id. at 49 (citing KY. REV. STAT. §121.055 (1982)).
54. Id. at 54-55. The Court found that some promises by candidates easily could be
prohibited without constitutional infringement, yet others plainly exceed the bounds of
state power to regulate political speech. Id. at 55. The conceivable and constitutional
justifications for an intrusion on speech in Brown required that the statute be applied
specifically as a ban on buying votes; an incentive for candidates lacking independent
wealth; or an application of states' interest in curtailing factual misstatements. Id. at 54.
An analogy can be drawn to demonstrate the limits of freedom of association: agreements
to conspire to commit illegal conduct are impermissible, despite any infringement on an
individual's right to association. Cf id. at 55. Therefore, certain statements in political
speeches clearly can be prohibited because of their illegal nature, including intentional
misstatements of fact. Id. at 60.
55. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1992) (reasoning that when there is a
conflict between protecting the constitutional right to vote and the First Amendment right
to engage in political discourse, the state has a compelling interest in preserving the free
and independent choice of the voter, so long as the protection is narrowly tailored).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 199.
58. Id. (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
231 (1989)) ("The Court also has recognized that a State 'indisputably has a compelling
interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.'"). The scope of the holding in
Burson narrowly defined integrity as the result of protection against fraud in the election
process. See id.
59. Id. at 199-200 (following the strict scrutiny test, once the compelling state interest
has been established, the state "must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the
asserted interest"). The Court found that prohibiting campaigning within a certain
[Vol. 53:267
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1. The First Prong of the Strict Scrutiny Test: A Compelling State
Interest
The suppression of speech is constitutional in limited circumstances,
namely, when the state can demonstrate that its interest in the
suppression is compelling: "When a State seeks to restrict directly the
offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First Amendment surely
requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by not only a
legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction
operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.
6°
Because freedom of speech is of fundamental importance within the
democratic process, the Court traditionally has imposed the strictest level
of scrutiny on state actions that seek to limit political speech.61
In both Brown and Burson, the Court evaluated several compelling
state interests asserted by parties supporting the regulation of political
speech.62 In the effort to monitor judicial elections, judicial impartiality
often creates the most frequently cited state interest.63  Impartiality is
crucial because people look to the courts to act as neutral arbiters of
disputes when divisive social and political issues confront society.64 In
distance of the polls served as a proper means of protecting a voter's right to cast a secret
ballot and to ensure freedom from the fraud and intimidation. Id. at 199-201.
60. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982).
61. E.g., id. (requiring a strict scrutiny test when the state intends to place limitations
on the dissemination of a candidate's campaign information and/or ideas); Eu, 489 U.S. at
225-26 (applying the strict scrutiny constitutional test to a state provision prohibiting
political parties from endorsing candidates in primary elections); Burson, 504 U.S. at 197-
98 (subjecting a restriction on political speech to the most rigorous standards of scrutiny
and requiring the state to demonstrate a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored
means to justify the prohibition on campaign speech within an area surrounding a polling
location).
62. Brown, 456 U.S. at 54. The Court permitted a limitation on specific types of
campaign speech, including vote buying, and to curtail purposeful misstatements of fact.
Id.
63. See e.g., Berger v. Sup. Ct. of Ohio, No. 87-3935, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 014657,
at *7 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 1989) (per curiam) (holding that the Ohio announce clause of the
state code of judicial conduct furthered a state interest in "ensuring judicial integrity and
impartiality"); see also ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990)
(holding that the Florida announce clause is not the least restrictive means to protect the
State's compelling interest in maintaining the judiciary's integrity).
64. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La., 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Ours is an
era in which members of the judiciary often are called upon to adjudicate cases squarely
presenting hotly contested social or political issues"). Justice Rehnquist compared the
role of judges to the role of an official in a basketball game:
The Constitution has placed the judiciary in a position similar to that of a referee
in a basketball game who is obliged to call a foul against a member of the home
team at a critical moment in the game: he will be soundly booed, but he is
nonetheless obliged to call it as he saw it, not as the home court crowd wants him
to call it.
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Morial v. Judiciary Commission, the Fifth Circuit declared that the state
has a compelling interest in protecting apparent and actual impartialityof the" • • 65
of the judiciary. The Western District of Kentucky extended the Fifth
Circuit's conclusion in finding impartiality of the judiciary to be a
compelling state interest:66
We have no difficulty finding a compelling state interest in an
impartial judiciary. An evenhanded, unbiased and impartial
judiciary is one of the pillars upon which our system of
government rests. To the degree appropriate, the conduct of
judicial elections . . . may be regulated so as to meet that
interest, even if freedom of speech is thereby constrained 67
Campaign speech that commits a candidate to a particular stance on an
issue upsets the "fundamental fairness" traditionally associated with an
impartial and independent judicial system.68
The preservation of integrity in the judicial branch serves as a second
69
alleged state interest. Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme
William H. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address: Act Well Your Part: Therein All Honor Lies, 7
PEPP. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1979). Maintaining judiciaries that are responsive to the
populous is contrary to the intentions of the founders. See id.
65. 565 F. 2d at 302 ("The state's interest in ensuring that judges be and appear to be
neither antagonistic nor beholden to any interest, party, or person is entitled to the
greatest respect.").
66. Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 313 (W.D.
Ky. 1991) (referring to the discussion in Morial, 565 F.2d at 302).
67. Id. (citation omitted).
68. See id. at 315 (concluding that the announce clause in the Kentucky Code of
Judicial Conduct appropriately addresses the compelling state interest in limiting speech
of judicial candidates in order to uphold the important principles of fairness and
impartiality, which are cornerstones of our justice system); see Max Minzner, Gagged But
Not Bound: The Ineffectiveness of the Rules Governing Judicial Campaign Speech, 68
UMKC L. REV. 209, 230-31 (1999) (citing Ackerson as the only federal case to focus
significantly on the compelling interest of the states in preserving the impartiality,
integrity, and fundamental fairness of the judiciary); see Mark Kozlowski, Striking
Prohibitions on Elected Judges' Political Speech Threatens Further Erosion of Public Faith
in Their Capacity to Act Impartially, N.J. L.J., July 29, 2002. Impartiality in judicial
elections serves to protect against the public perception that judges have decided cases
and issues before reviewing the specific facts of a case:
The essence of the judicial office is impartiality in fact and in appearance. A
judicial candidate who takes specific positions on legal and political issues during
a campaign may communicate-or be perceived as communicating-a
willingness to prejudge certain types of cases. Should such a candidate be
successful at the polls, his or her capacity to live up to the professional ideal of
impartiality may well be compromised.
Id.
69. Compare Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir.
1991) (finding the actual and perceived integrity of the judiciary is an essential quality of a
functioning system of government), with ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp 1094, 1098 (N.D.
Fla. 1992) (opining that Florida's announce clause, intended to protect a compelling state
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Court of Pennsylvania0 confirmed the view that the public's impression
of the judiciary, as an institution with the highest standards of integrity,
was vital to the function of state government and was a compelling state
*71interest. In an essay on the impact of politics on the judiciary, one
scholar seeks guidance from John Locke:
Judicial integrity is a vital element of a legitimate society
because, as John Locke observed, as part of their social contract
humans surrender their inherent rights of self-judgment and
private dispute resolution to the processes of the political
community in order to transcend an insecure and uncertain
71state of nature based on individual power.
Therefore, because people rely on equitable treatment of public disputes,
the judiciary must maintain an unbiased disposition.73
Still, other states argue that their interest in limiting a judicial
candidate's speech is essential to protect litigants' fundamental right to a
fair and unbiased trier of fact.74 Judges selected through an unrestrictedS 75
election process may become beholden to their campaign commitments.
The ultimate consequence of an uninhibited freedom of political speech
in the context of judicial elections could affect the constitutionally
76guaranteed rights of future litigants.
interest in judicial integrity, failed because it was overly broad and captured too much
political speech).
70. 944 F. 2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 142.
72. David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the
American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 374 (2001).
73. Id. at 375 (citing Justice Anthony Kennedy's comments on the need to sustain an
impartial judiciary that is detached from the public will and committed to upholding the
principle of independence and neutrality).
74. Minzner, supra note 68, at 235-36 (theorizing that campaign commitments and
promises skew a judge's objectivity and deprive litigants' of their due process right to a fair
and unbiased trial).
75. Buckley v. Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993). To allow a
judge to make a commitment to decide a particular issue in a particular way diminishes a
judge's ability to differentiate from that commitment once elected to the court. Id.
Additionally, a judicial candidate, much like candidates for legislative or executive office
positions, would naturally desire to uphold campaign commitments or promises, thus
undermining the fundamental impartiality of his future decisions. Id.
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the rights of an accused to an impartial
jury of the State); Minzner, supra note 68, at 228-30, 235-36. Minzner proposes that states
have taken the wrong course in defending the interests in regulating judicial campaign
speech. Id. at 230. Rather than alleging an interest in impartiality, for the sake of the
judicial image, parties should assert a compelling state interest in an independent judiciary
for the purpose of protecting the litigants' constitutional rights. Id. at 230, 235-36. The
majority opinion in Republican Party v. White failed to find a constitutional conflict
between the First Amendment rights of judges and the constitutional rights of litigants
who go before judges who have made commitments during their campaigns, in large part
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2. The Second Prong of the Strict Scrutiny Test: Narrow Tailoring
The second prong of the strict scrutiny test requires the state to
demonstrate that the means employed are narrowly tailored to achieve
the allegedly compelling state interest.77 For a limitation on speech to
meet the "narrowly tailored" test, it cannot be overly broad in its capture
of speech and it must relate to the state's asserted interests.8 Prior to
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the lower courts divided over
whether the announce clause of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and
similar state codes were overly broad.79 The breadth with which a court
interprets the speech captured under a state code is the determining
factor in whether it finds the code violates of the First Amendment.
80
In Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
the court applied traditional canons of construction in order to achieve a
narrow view that the announce clause was consistent with the
Constitution. ' Stretton interpreted Canon 7 of the Pennsylvania Code,
because they found ambiguous the meaning of impartiality asserted by the respondents.
536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002). See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the meaning of impartiality.
77. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982) (indicating that limitations on speech
are acceptable only when the limitations avoid infringing on otherwise guarded speech);
see supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989) (stating that the traditional test for an action of the state
that infringes on a fundamental right requires that the means directly meet the asserted
interest).
78. E.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 53-54; Eu, 489 U.S. at 222.
79. Compare Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 142-44 (3d
Cir. 1991) (interpreting the Pennsylvania counterpart to the Model Code Canon 5 (1990)
as narrowly construed to apply strictly to types of judicial speech that would violate the
compelling interests of the state of Pennsylvania), and Berger v. Sup. Ct. of Ohio, No. 87-
3935, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 014657, at *6-7 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 1989) (per curiam)
(concluding that the Ohio equivalent to the Model Code Canon 7 (1972) was narrowly
tailored because it afforded candidates room to run in a truthful, upright, and vigorous
manner), and Ackerson v. Ky. Jud. Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D.
Ky. 1991) (finding the Kentucky counterpart to the Model Code's announce clause to be
sufficiently tailored to the compelling interest in maintaining an impartial and objective
judiciary), with Buckley v. I11. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
that the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 67 (B)(1)(c) extended beyond the bounds of
limitations on speech, which could reasonably be considered to compromise judicial
impartiality), and ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp 1094, 1098-99 (N.D. Fla. 1990)
(suggesting that Florida's announce clause is intended to protect a compelling state
interest in judicial integrity, and concluding that the clause fails on the grounds that it is
overly broad and captures too much political speech).
80. See Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142-43 (evaluating the announce clause within the
Pennsylvania Canons of Judicial Conduct, and finding the Pennsylvania clause to be
tailored narrowly due to the initial narrow construction by the counsels for the
Disciplinary Board and Judicial Inquiry and Review Board).
81. Id. at 142-44 (highlighting the canon of construction that vests the courts with the
duty to construe statutes or regulations to avoid constitutional questions whenever
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which prohibits the announcement of views on "disputed legal or, ,82
political issues, as a prohibition on only those issues that are likely to
come before the court."3 The majority concluded that any issue likely to
come before the court is properly outside the limits of acceptable judicial
candidate speech. 84
In Buckley v. Illinois, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the announce
clause and the promise and pledge clause of the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules to be overly broad and an impermissible infringement on
candidate speech." The Illinois rule contains a proviso that acts as a
loophole to the total prohibition of political discussion: "[A judge] may
announce his views on measures to improve the law, the legal system, or
the administration of justice, if, in doing so, he does not cast doubt on his
capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him.
86
Although the defendants in Buckley v. Illinois attempted to persuade the
court that the Illinois rule could be read narrowly, the court refused to
construe the rule so that it would endure constitutional tests.
8 7
The court in Buckley v. Illinois recognized the conflict between its
holding and that of the Third Circuit in Stretton.88 In addressing the
possible). Furthermore, the court stated that in consideration of state interests, a
narrower interpretation is most appropriate. Id. at 143. Announcements that involve the
resolution of specific cases or issues likely to come before the court would not further an
interest in impartiality and therefore are rightly prohibited. Id.
82. PA. CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT Canon 7 (B)(1)(c) (1975).
83. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144 (speculating that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
interpret this phrase to include only those issues likely to arise before an elected judge in a
court of law).
84. Id. (holding that judicial candidates should not announce their views on issues
likely to come before them, to prevent the public perception that the judicial office is
partial or bias to an issue or litigant).
85. Buckley v. Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that
the phrase "disputed legal or political issues" encompasses virtually every type of relevant
speech and does not meet the narrowly tailored constitutional standard).
86. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 67 (B)(1)(c)(1993). The Court in Buckley found the proviso to
the announce clause to be insufficient in delineating the acceptable legal or political issues
that a candidate can address. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 229-30.
87. Buckley v. Ill., 997 F.2d at 229-30 (refusing to rewrite or interpret the rule
contrary to its drafter's intentions). The counsel in favor of upholding the rule argued
numerous ways that the court could give the rule a more constitutional or narrow reading.
Id. at 229. The court rejected this approach and subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted a rule in accordance with the 1990 ABA Code. See ILL. SUP. CT. R.
67(A)(3)(d)(i)(2003) (prohibiting judicial candidates "from [making] statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies, or issues
within cases that are likely to come before the court").
88. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 230-31 (noting that the Third Circuit's decision in Stretton
directly conflicts with the holding in Buckley v. Illinois because the court in Buckley
refused to impose its own narrow interpretation on an announce clause, which clearly
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discrepancy, the Seventh Circuit found that the Third Circuit's narrow
interpretation of the announce clause, which prohibited only a
candidate's announcement of his position on an issue likely to come
before the court, caused the Code's announce clause to merge with the
promises and pledge clause of the same Canon. 9 Traditional canons of
statutory construction dictate that the use of different words in a statute
indicate an intent for those words to give different meanings; therefore,
the Stretton court's interpretation of the announce clause is incorrect
because its interpretation is indistinguishable from the promise and
pledge clause.90
II. AN UNSUCCESSFUL JUDICIAL CANDIDATE GOES TO THE BENCH
In 1998, Mr. Wersal, joined by several family members, the Republican
Party, and its affiliated associations, filed a claim in federal court seeking
an injunction against the enforcement of Canon 5 of the Minnesota
Judicial Code of Conduct.91 This action was filed against Minnesota
officials, including "the Chair of the Lawyers Board, the Director of the
Office of Professional Responsibility and the Chair of the Judicial
Board." 9 Count II of Wersal's complaint challenged the constitutionality
circumscribed judicial candidates' fundamental freedom of speech through a sweeping and
impermissibly vague provision).
89. Id. at 230 (suggesting that the narrow interpretation of the Stretton court "fold[s]
the 'announce' clause back into the 'pledges or promises' clause").
90. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 114-15 (Aspen Law &
Business 2d ed. 2002) (listing some of the common canons of statutory construction,
including the rule that "[a] statute should be construed such that none of its terms is
redundant").
91. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875, 875-76 (D. Minn. 1998).
The plaintiff, Wersal, was a judicial candidate in the 1996 election for the position of
Associate Justice on the Minnesota Supreme Court; he anticipated entering the judicial
race in 1998 when he filed this claim. Id. at 876. Wersal's wife and brother joined him as
plaintiffs in the various counts of his claim against the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct because the Code restricted the political activity of a judicial candidate's family.
Id. at 876-77. Additionally, the Republican Party and its affiliated associations joined
Wersal because the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited a judicial candidate's
political affiliation and activity with political organizations. Id. Together, plaintiffs sought
an injunction against enforcement, claiming that the Minnesota Code violates
fundamental rights of speech, association, and equal protection, which both the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee. Id. 877-78. The Minnesota Code was
revised in 1997 to clarify previous ambiguities; the prior version was thought to violate the
First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 876; see Republican Party of
Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F.Supp. 2d 967, 972-73 (D. Minn. 1999).
92. Republican Party v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 970. The defendants in this action
represented the various divisions associated with the enforcement of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Id. The Chair of the Lawyers Board oversees the Office of Professional
Responsibility and promulgates opinions on issues of professional responsibility. Id. The
Office of Professional Responsibility is responsible for the investigation and prosecution
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of the code's "ban on judicial candidates announcing their views on
disputed legal or political issues."93 During the course of Wersal's 1998
campaign, he refused to address media and public inquiries for fear that
his statements would fall under the announce clause prohibitions on
judicial candidate speech. 4  The district court found the issue of
suppressed speech justiciable even though neither the Office of
Professional Responsibility nor the Lawyers Board found Wersal to have
actually violated the announce clause within the codes of conduct during
a prior campaign. 9' The district court held that the announce clause was
sufficiently narrow to meet the compelling state interest in protecting the
impartiality of the judiciary. 6
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the petitioners asserted that if the
district court's narrow construction of the announce clause applied only
to issues that may come before an elected candidate, then the announce
clause and the promise and pledge clause of Canon 5 become
indistinguishable.9 The Eighth Circuit distinguished between a
of complaints against lawyers, and its Director determines whether and what discipline is
warranted in individual cases. Id. The Judicial Board's obligations are to "receive
complaints, investigate, conduct hearings and make recommendations to the Minnesota
Supreme Court concerning judges alleged to have violated the Codes of Judicial
Conduct." Id.
93. Republican Party v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 974. Counts I, III and IV addressed
alternative constitutional issues pertaining to judicial candidates' and their families' right
to attend and speak at political gatherings, identify with a political party, and seek and
solicit political campaign contributions. Id.
94. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001).
95. Id., 63 F. Supp. 2d at 983-84. The defendants argued that they only intended to
enforce the announce clause only if the court were to rule that it was in fact constitutional.
Id. at 983. The court explained that "nonenforcement will not be an impediment to
finding justiciability where the record does not show that the statute or rule at issue has
been commonly and notoriously violated in the past." Id.
96. Republican Party v. Kelly, 63 F.3d at 986; Republican Party v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp.
at 880. The district court found viable the plaintiffs' second count, which claimed that the
announce clause of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct was overly broad and
therefore did not meet the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test. 996 F. Supp.
at 879. Nonetheless, the court declined to grant injunctive relief because, "balanc[ing]
hardships" between the candidate and the public interest, the state's interest in protecting
the non-partisan status quo of present judicial elections was greater, whereas the
candidate would have future opportunities to capitalize on political endorsements. Id. at
879-80. The district court concluded: "[B]y interpreting the announce clause as only
prohibiting discussion of a judicial candidate's predisposition to issues likely to come
before the court, the announce clause serves the state's compelling interest in maintaining
the actual and apparent integrity and independence of its judiciary, while not
unnecessarily curtailing protected speech." 63 F.3d at 986.
97. Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 877; cf. supra note 90 and accompanying
text (discussing the holding in Buckley v. Illinois that a narrow interpretation of the
announce clause causes the announce and promise and pledge clauses to merge).
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candidate's pledge and an announcement of a candidate's views and
deemed both necessary in order to meet the compelling state interest in
an impartial judiciary:
To be sure, the pledges and promises provision of Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(i) addresses the type of campaign conduct that most
blatantly subverts the judicial office-pledges by candidates to
make specific decisions on the bench. However, it does not
reach the full range of campaign activity that can undermine the
State's interests in an independent and impartial judiciary. 98
The announce clause, the court said, necessarily reaches beyond the
promise and pledge clause to limit a candidate's speech with regard to
personal views on the constitutionality of social issues or other original
issues of law.99  Subsequently, the court determined that both
announcements of political views and promises by judicial candidates
frustrate the state's compelling interest in maintaining an impartial
judiciary, both in appearance and actuality.'0°
III. THE COURT'S OPINIONS FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE GUIDANCE
FOR CANDIDATES AND COURTS
Following the Eighth Circuit's denial of an injunction against
enforcement of the Minnesota Code, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to the petitioners' appeal, but only on the issue of the
announce clause. °1 The Court first defined the limits of its review by
narrowing the scope of the opinion to the issue of the announce clause.0 2
98. Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 877.
99. Id. (explaining that these types of candidate statements do not explicitly prejudge
legal issues, but rather lend themselves to establishing a candidate's bias on issues that
may come before the court).
100. Id. The court explained the dilemma candidates will likely face when permitted
to commit themselves to political issues or predispose themselves to a particular legal issue
during the campaign:
When a candidate is later called upon as a judge to preside over cases involving
disputed issues about which he or she has made campaign announcements, the
judge is placed in an awkward, if not impossible, position . . . having already
expressed [his] opinion during the campaign, the judge risks appearing as though
he or she prejudged the case rather than gave it due consideration in light of the
law, arguments, and facts.
Id. at 878. As a result, the judicial system's legitimacy suffers a blow in the eyes of the
public. Id. On the other hand, the court noted, if the elected judge decides a case in a
manner contrary to his espoused views on the campaign trail, the judge risks abandonment
by his prior supporters. Id.
101. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001).
102. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002) (distinguishing the
promise and pledge clause from the announce clause based on their simultaneous
existence within the Minnesota Code and similar codes of judicial conduct).
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, announced that the Court refused
to express any opinion on the promise and pledge clause of the
Minnesota Judicial Code or the ABA Model Code, and that the Court
only intended to rule on the announce clause.03 Additionally, all parties
concurred that strict scrutiny was the proper test for a restriction on
political speech. °4
The first prong of the strict scrutiny test requires the Court to find a
compelling state interest. 5 Although the Eighth Circuit purported
found the preservation of actual and apparent impartiality was
sufficiently compelling state interest, the majority abstained from
definitively answering whether the first prong of strict scrutiny was met.
16
According to Justice Scalia, impartiality can take on several meanings: 1)
the absence of bias against either party in a judicial proceeding; 07 2) the
lack of pre-formulated judgment on legal " and 3) open-
mindedness." The majority disposed of each purported definition of
impartiality, "0 and ultimately determined that the announce clause was
103. Id. at 770-71 (stating that the promises and pledges clause was not challenged by
the petitioner and therefore could not be reviewed).
104. Id. at 774-75 (explaining that in order to prove the validity of the "announce"
clause, the respondents must demonstrate the clause's narrow tailoring in meeting a
compelling state interest).
105. Id.; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (illustrating the first prong of
the strict scrutiny test).
106. Id. at 775-76 (choosing to define impartiality in the judiciary as the absence of
bias toward any one party in a court of law).
107. Id. (citing the traditional use of the word from WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L
DICrIONARY 1247 (2d ed. 1950)). The use of impartiality to mean unbiased or equitable
treatment of all persons similarly situated supports the claim that due process requires
impartiality of the judiciary. 536 U.S. at 775-76.
108. 536 U.S. at 775-76 (finding that impartiality in a judicial context could mean a
lack of preconceived opinions about relevant legal issues in a case).
109. Id. at 778 (explaining that open-mindedness is not an absence of prejudgment
regarding legal issues, but rather receptiveness to the various legal arguments that might
surround a given judicial question).
110. See id. at 775-80. Impartiality, defined as a lack of bias toward a litigating party,
cannot qualify as the compelling state interest for the purpose of strict scrutiny because
the announce clause of the Minnesota Code does not attempt to target this form of
impartiality. See id. at 775-76. The announce clause does not seek to inhibit candidate
speech regarding particular parties; instead it aims to curtail candidate discourse on
political and legal issues. Id. at 776. Impartiality, interpreted to mean a lack of
preconception is not a compelling state interest, according to the majority. Id. at 777-78.
In fact, "[a] judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has
never been thought a necessary component of equal justice .... It is virtually impossible
to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the law." Id. at 777.
Additionally, because preconceptions are not undesirable, suggesting that they do not
exist for appearance's sake cannot represent a compelling state interest. See id. at 778.
Finally, the announce clause of the Minnesota Code does not protect open-mindedness as
a form of impartiality. See id. at 778-79. Rather, jurists and attorneys commit themselves
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short-sighted and grossly under-inclusive for the purpose of eliminating
all statements that indicate a candidate's predisposition with regard to
potential legal controversies.
The majority found an obvious conflict between a state's constitution,
which provides for judicial accountability through elections, and state
• •.-  .• 112
rules promulgated to protect the judiciary from over-politicization.
The state's effort to regulate the manner of its elections ultimately
burdened voter access to candidate views: "[T]he First Amendment does
not permit ... elections ... [to take] place while preventing candidates
from discussing what the elections are about. '[T]he greater power to
dispense with elections altogether does not include the lesser power to
conduct elections under conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance.""1
3
Therefore, the First Amendment upholds a voter's right to full, educated
participation in the democratic process, for as long as voters are called
upon to exercise that right."
4
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion to emphasize
the inaccuracy of the state's claim that the announce clause was
necessary to protect the state interest in an independent and impartial
judiciary."' Justice O'Connor's concurrence shed light on the weakness
of the state argument that exclusively puts forth impartiality and
independence as compelling state interests. When impartiality and
independence represent a state's only interests, such interests are easily
satisfied within constitutional means by employing an alternate judicial
selection system without risking an intrusion on the First Amendment
rights of judicial candidates. 1 7
to positions on legal issues long before they consider candidacy, through their speeches,
academic writings, and rulings on earlier cases. Id. In reality, the announce clause fails to
capture all of the speech that might point to a candidate's impartiality or predisposition on
legal issues, and this under-inclusiveness serves as the reason the announce clause fails the
strict scrutiny test. See id. at 779-80.
111. See id. at 779-80 (finding that the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct makes no
attempt to eliminate certain extra-judicial activities, including public speech and papers on
jurisprudence, which surely indicate a judge's disposition on certain matters of law).
112. See id. at 787-88 (disallowing Minnesota and other states, who have chosen to
elect their judges through popular elections, to attempt to restrict the information flow to
the electorate).
113. Id. at 788.
114. See id. (stating that the election of the officials encompasses the strongest area of
First Amendment protections for political speech).
115. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expressing her concern about the potential of
judicial elections, by their very political nature, to contradict the asserted compelling
interest in impartiality, irrespective of the words used in campaign speeches).
116. See id. at 792 (blaming the State of Minnesota for creating the problem of bias in
the judiciary through its adoption of a popular election judicial selection process).
117. See id. at 788-90. Justice O'Connor was likely inferring that Minnesota and the
other states that maintain popular judicial elections are simply asking for trouble in
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Alternatively, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but
contended that the Court need not reach a strict scrutiny analysis of the
speech restrictions.' 18 Justice Kennedy wrote that a fundamental right to
speech can only be curbed when it infringes on another fundamental
right." 9 In the instant case, Justice Kennedy found that the state failed to
assert protection of a conflicting fundamental right and therefore, the
restriction was unconstitutional.
1 20
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens, in dissent, distinguished between
elected judges and other publicly elected officials.' 2' According to the
sustaining impartiality. See id. at 792. Rather than violate freedom of speech under the
Constitution, states may alter their selection systems to eradicate altogether their political
nature. See id. at 791-92.
118. Id. at 792-93 (concluding, under the First Amendment, that the speech of political
candidates stretches the boundaries of the government's direct regulatory power); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are
Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 735 (2002) (asserting that the government should
not require candidates' silence on issues that could influence a voter's choice). Prior to the
Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Indiana University's Law
Review held a symposium on the First Amendment issues entwined in judicial campaigns.
Id. Professor Chemerinsky articulated the position, later adopted by Justice Kennedy,
which applies the strictest safeguards on political speech, regardless of the elected position
sought by the speaker:
Government-imposed, content-based restrictions on the speech of political
candidates, in virtually any circumstance, are unconstitutional .... [I]f states are
going to make judges and judicial candidates into politicians by requiring them to
run for office or retention, then these individuals should have the same basic
right to free speech as all others standing for election.
Id. To limit the information accessible to voters who are later asked to make an educated
choice as to a candidate conflicts with established principles of democracy. Id.
119. See 536 U.S. at 793; Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (articulating his position on the narrow
area in which the First Amendment can be trumped). If the law at issue is directed at
speech traditionally unprotected by the First Amendment, then and only then will the
Court allow limitations. Id. Otherwise, the provision or statute must be invalidated to
conform to the fundamental right to Free Speech. Id.
120. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. at 792-93 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Kennedy articulated his position on the important protection of First
Amendment speech in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211-14 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). In that case, Justice Kennedy held that the only instance in which one's First
Amendment right can be inhibited is when the freedom of speech conflicts with another
fundamental right protected under the Constitution. Id. at 213-14. Justice Kennedy also
found voting a fundamental right for which the absolute right to expression must narrowly
yield. Id.
121. Compare 536 U.S. at 795-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that regulating the
speech of any type of political or judicial candidate frustrates the very purpose of the First
Amendment's special guard against limits on political speech), and id. at 783 (Scalia, J.)
(clarifying that the majority's opinion is not based on equating judicial elections to
elections for other political office, in terms of acceptable speech), with id. at 797-98
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of resting its case on the lack of distinctions
between a judge's right to express his opinion and the same right of any other elected
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dissent, the important distinction between the rights and obligations of a
judicial candidate and those of other elected officials should dictate the
level of protection that freedom of speech affords their respective
claims. 12  Executive and legislative candidates are true political actors
whose role is to represent their respective constituencies, whereas
elected judges are responsible for interpreting the law without
attachment to parties or the public will.i 3
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg raised the issue of the interdependence
between the promise and pledge clause and the announce clause,
challenged in the instant case.24 Ginsburg explained that the promise
and pledge clause is necessary to guard the due process and equal
protection rights of litigants. 125 She asserted that states are justified in
prohibiting candidate expressions of commitment in order to protect
official), and id. at 803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (differentiating between the right of
judges to speak out during campaigns from the right of other elected officials, based upon
the obligations and expectations tied to each position).
122. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. at 805-07 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). The First Amendment's protection of candidate speech for those officials
serving in a representative capacity differs from the protection afforded candidate speech
of those offices, which are intended to appear impartial:
Campaign statements committing the [political] candidate to take sides on
contentious issues are ... not only appropriate in political elections, they are "at
the core of our electoral process .... " Judges ... are not political actors. They
do not sit as representatives of particular persons, communities, or parties; they
serve no faction or constituency. "[Ilt is the business of judges to be indifferent
to popularity."
Id. (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401 n. 29 (1991)). Therefore, freedom from
restrictions on speech in representative elections enables the public to formulate an
educated choice. Id. In contrast, judicial candidates are not elected to serve as
representatives; rather, they are elected to serve independent of partisanship. Id. at 806.
123. See 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (articulating the flaws of the majority
opinion to include the "assumption that judicial candidates should have the same freedom
'to express themselves' . .. as do all other elected officials"); see id. at 803-04 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (affirming Justice Stevens' views and pointing out that judges, "[u]nlike their
counterparts . . . are expected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies or
committing themselves on controversial issues in advance of adversarial presentation").
124. See id. 536 U.S. at 812-13 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (indicating that the announce
clause's constitutionality can only be looked at in light of its symbiotic relationship with
the promise and pledge clause).
125. Id. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg favors an analysis of
impartiality as a compelling state interest for the purpose of securing the due process
rights of litigants: "The impartiality guaranteed to litigants through the Due Process
Clause adheres to a core principle [that] . . . 'no person will be deprived of his interests in
the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the
arbiter is not predisposed to find against him."' Id. (citations omitted). Whether the jurist
has a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the case need not be proven to show a
denial of due process. Id. at 815. Rather, the mere appearance of bias is sufficient. See id.
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against the possible temptation of a judge's bias. 126  Justice Ginsburg
ruled the promise and pledge clause constitutional and found the
announce clause to be an indispensable component in maintaining the
state interest in the preservation of due process and judicial
impartiality. 127
Although the majority and dissent clearly disagreed on the
constitutionality of the announce clause, some members shared a general
dissatisfaction with the inherent problems stemming from popularly
elected judges. Justice O'Connor explained that the regulation of
judicial candidate speech was not the least intrusive method of guarding
a state's interest in impartiality. 29  It is apparent from the Court's
conflicting treatment of the promise and pledge clause-the majority's
avoidance of the issue and the dissent's foretelling treatment of the
clause-that the Court will see future challenges to the speech limitations
within state codes of judicial conduct. 3 °
The question remains whether the promise and pledge clause of the
Minnesota Code and similar state codes can survive the same exacting
126. Id. at 813-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg found that a second
compelling interest for the "pledges and promises" clause was that it assists in maintaining
the public confidence in the judiciary's independence. Id. at 817.
127. Id. at 819 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg said that the promise and
pledge clause and the announce clause are effective only when coupled together for
enforcement purposes. Id. A promissory statement can be avoided easily in the absence
of the announce clause, and therefore, she concluded, both are distinguishable and
necessary to maintain the interest in due process and impartiality of a judiciary. Id. at 820-
21.
128. See id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (doubting whether, in spite of the belief
and intention that judges will not base decisions on the potential political consequences of
a case, the nature of the electoral process makes a judge's consciousness of the political
ramifications unavoidable); see also id. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (acknowledging
the implicit disparity between the desire for an impartial judiciary and the political
practice of judicial elections).
129. See id. at 791-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (detailing alternative forms of judicial
selection employed by states, other than popular election). The alternatives to popular
election of judicial candidates include: 1) non-partisan elections; 2) executive nomination
and legislative confirmation; and 3) a "merit system" involving the initial appointment
followed by unopposed retention elections. Id.; see also Sarah Mathias, ELECTING
JUSTICE: A HANBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORM 5 (1990) (describing various
methods of judicial selection).
130. Compare Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. at 770 (stating that because the
petitioner did not challenge the promise and pledge clause it could not be reviewed), with
id. at 812-13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg articulated her opinion on the
constitutionality of the promise and pledge clause of judicial codes of conduct even though
the majority declared it was not at issue in the instant case. Id. In expanding her opinion
beyond an evaluation of the announce clause, Justice Ginsburg recognized her defeat in
this preliminary battle to defend the states' right to limit judicial candidate speech. See id.
At the same time, she established the precedent for her argument with regard to the more
narrowly focused promise and pledge clause. See id.
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test that disabled the announce clause.' Because the majority did not
definitively indicate whether impartiality, integrity of the judiciary, or the
due process rights of litigants were sufficient to meet the compelling state
interest test, future challenges to judicial candidate speech restrictions
could fail on either prong of the strict scrutiny test.32 The promise and
pledge clause remains one of the last barriers to equalizing judicial and
general political elections.133 Candidates will likely test this barrier in
future litigation in order to push the Court to a more decisive
conclusion. 34 The Supreme Court, for now, has deferred to the state
courts' determination on how to distinguish a statement that concerns a
candidate's views on political or legal issues from one that promises or
pledges certain conduct while in office.'35 Furthermore, the division in
the Court suggests that the ultimate question to be resolved is whether
any modern judicial selection system can adequately balance the
democratic desire for accountability with the individual's right to an
impartial judiciary, without infringing on the judicial candidate or
nominee's fundamental freedom of speech.36
131. See Coyle, supra note 35 (predicting that new litigation on the constitutionality of
the promise and pledge clauses is imminent because of the Supreme Court's ambiguous
decision in Republican Party v. White).
132. Compare Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 742 (disputing the claim that public
confidence in the judiciary and judicial integrity are sufficient state interests to satisfy the
first prong of strict scrutiny analysis), with Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts:
Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35 IND. L. REV. 701, 714-16, 723 (2002) (noting that
various state interests, previously argued as sufficient to meet the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test, have failed). O'Neil explains that the integrity of the judiciary, public
confidence in the justice system, and the appearance of impartiality are insufficient
interests. Id. Ultimately, the states must assert the vital interest in protecting the due
process rights of individual litigants to meet the compelling state interest test. See id.
133. Mathias, supra note 129, at 33 (opining that promises and pledges have no place
in the campaign for judicial office because judges are elected to be impartial and
independent of the electorate). The greatest distinguishing factor between general
political elections and judicial elections is that judges do not represent a constituency. See
id. To that end, judicial candidates should not imply, through a political platform, that
they can facilitate an agenda once installed into office. See id.
134. Coyle, supra note 35 (quoting the statement of Roy Schotland, of the
Georgetown University Law Center, who claims that because the Court eliminated only
the announce clause from state judicial codes, future candidates will inevitably challenge
the remaining restrictions on speech under the First Amendment).
135. See Chemerinsky, supra note 121, at 739-40 (contending that the overwhelming
problem with the Model Code restrictions on speech is the vague language employed in
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)).
136. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Elastic Nature of Judicial Independence and
Judicial Accountability, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
167-68 (Gordon M. Griller & E. Keith Stott, Jr., eds., 2002) (discussing the various judicial
selection systems invoked by state and federal constitutions in an effort to strike a balance
between decisional independence, which protects against bias, and institutional
independence, which protects against executive or legislative control over the judiciary).
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IV. THE CAREFUL BALANCE BETWEEN IMPARTIALITY, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The conflict between maintaining both the appearance and the reality
of an impartial judiciary and affording judicial candidates their rightful
protection under the First Amendment has led many scholars and judges
to theorize about the best form of judicial selection.137 Although the
Constitution maintains a system of executive nomination and Senate
confirmation of federal judges, the states rid themselves of exclusive
executive appointments after the signing of the Declaration of
Independence. 3 At the time of the Declaration, states were weary of
centralized control and feared a resurrection of the English system in
which a King exclusively appointed judges. 3 9 Following the era of
Jacksonian democracy, the states began instituting electoral selection
systems for judges with the aim of diminishing the elitists' control of state
judiciaries.'4 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the judiciary
fell victim to the problems that plagued the other elected branches,
137. See, e.g., Mathias, supra note 129, at 33-42 (evaluating various non-legal solutions
to the present conflict between public desire for accountability of the judiciary and the
fundamental characteristic of an independent judicial branch); Behrens & Silverman,
supra note 2, at 276 (theorizing that appointive systems, although imperfect, are the best
systems for insulating judges from political influence); Matthew J. O'Hara, Restriction of
Judicial Election Candidates' Free Speech Rights After Buckley: A Compelling
Constitutional Limitation?, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 197, 235 (1994) (arguing that the only
sure method of protecting judges from outside influences and political pressure is to enact
life tenures for all judges, similar to the federal system). See also Geyh, supra note 136, at
167-71 (comparing the various state systems weighted in favor of accountability and
institutional independence with the federal system, which places emphasis on decisional
independence).
138. O'Hara, supra note 137, at 205 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 11 (U.S. 1776)); see also Joel F. Knutson, Judicial Selection in the States: Historical
Context and Ongoing Debates, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 195, 199 (Gordon M. Griller & E. Keith Stott, Jr. eds., 2002).
139. Knutson, supra note 138, at 199 (recounting the history of judicial selection in the
states and attributing the change in the executive appointment process to the King of
England's oppressive appointment and control over the English judiciary). The
Declaration of Independence states: "He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone,
for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries." THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
140. Knutson, supra note 138, at 199 (crediting the presidency of Andrew Jackson for
the era of popular democracy that followed him, which in turn led to the spread of state
judicial elections throughout the country); see also Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of
Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY (1993), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/justice/howdid/nelson.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2003) (articulating the
view of several scholars who believe that the swift enactment of judicial election systems in
the states in the mid-nineteenth century was due to an impulsive wave of democratic
emotion and desire for a representative judiciary).
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including corruption and party machines.14 1 Members of the judiciary
became beholden to party machines, prompting the introduction of a
"merit selection" system.14 2 The lasting presence of judicial elections,
since their introduction in the first part of the nineteenth century,
indicates strong popular approval for maintaining a system of
. .- . • • 143
accountability and democratic responsiveness in state judiciaries.
Neither eliminating the system of popularly elected judges nor
instituting an appointment and retention process would necessarily
insulate the judiciary from the pressures associated with retaining their
judgeships.' 44 The framers recognized that an independent judiciary was
essential to enable federal judges to perform judicial review over the
executive and legislative branches of government, and to make difficult
or controversial decisions without fear of popular backlash. 4' These
concerns underlie the constitutional provisions regarding the
appointment and life tenure of judges. Through their respective
141. Knutson, supra note 138, at 200-02 (explaining the ebb and flow of judicial
selection systems, which eventually led to the introduction of the "merit" system of
selection by Missouri in 1940). Knutson posits that the limitation on voter access to
information about judicial candidates in early judicial elections contributed to the rise in
political party influences over the candidacy and the subsequent election of judges. Id. at
200. Several states first attempted to curb the contradiction between impartiality and
political bias by instituting non-partisan judicial elections. Id. Non-partisan elections were
criticized for their inhibiting effect on the information made available to voters and the
behind-the-scenes presence of political players. Id.
142. See Mathias, supra note 129, at 5 (1990). In a merit selection system, the state
governor first appoints a judge from a brief list of candidates put forth by a nominating
committee. Id. The judicial appointment is for a specific term and is followed by non-
competitive retention elections in which the electorate vote for or against the continuance
of office. Id.
143. See Geyh, supra note 136, at 167-70 (reasoning that state and federal judiciaries
are successful in their attempts to achieve impartiality in a democratic system despite
using differing methods).
144. See O'Hara, supra note 137, at 235. Executive officers likely prefer appointed
judges because they believe that the appointment process gives them some control over
the judiciary or, at the very least, the opportunity to select judges with strong loyalties to
their appointing officer. Id. at 209. Contrary to this point, the Executive is not always
satisfied by its attempts to control or influence the direction of the judiciary. See Robert
H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 FIRST THINGS 21-23 (1996). Despite the Reagan and
Bush administrations' efforts to appoint federal judges with reputations for deciding cases
based on original intent, the courts have been largely out of sync with those views. Id.
Robert Bork argues that federal judges are neither accountable to the executive, nor to
public sentiment, and have become reckless with decision-making that is leading our
nation down a path of moral destruction. Id. at 21-23.
145. Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Search for Fairness,
Independence, and Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 668, 668-69 (2001) (elaborating
on the reasoning behind Article III Section 1 of the Constitution). Article III provides
that "[t]he judges, both of the supreme court and inferior Courts, shall hold their offices
during good Behaviour"). U.S. CONST. art. III § 1.
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constitutions, the states have chosen to implement various systems of
judicial selection, which vary from the federal system, because of their
desire to give greater weight to accountability.
146
To determine whether the state selection system of judicial elections
are, as Justice O'Connor indicated in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, the least balanced form of judicial selection, the various forms of
selection must be evaluated in light of the ideal balance between
accountability, impartiality, and respect for the First Amendment. 147 The
merit selection system attempts to strike a balance between over-
politicization, resulting from popular elections, and the original fear of
executive branch influence.4  Unfortunately, the recent decision by the
Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White did not indicate to what
extent, if any, states may maintain limited restrictions on speech in their
present electoral systems. The Court only indicated that states
employing general limits on speech should develop systems of judicial
selection that meet their interests in impartiality while steering clear of
First Amendment violations.1
49
146. Geyh, supra note 136, at 167-71 (accepting that states and the federal government
have sought to balance the independence of the judiciary with the principles of
accountability essential to a democracy through very different means). Although the
states have sought lesser protection of the "decisional independence" of their courts than
their federal counterparts have, state courts often have stronger systems of institutional
independence, which emphasizes the separation of powers principles fundamental in both
state and federal constitutions. Id. at 169-70.
147. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-89 (2002) (rejecting the
state's argument that the restrictions on speech in the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct
are necessary in order to protect the impartiality and independence of the state judicial
system). See Mathias, supra note 129, at 5 (explaining the four major selection processes,
including: appointive systems, partisan elective systems, nonpartisan elective systems, and
merit selection systems). Mathias suggests non-legal reforms that might serve as
mechanisms for balancing the interests of judicial candidates, the electorate, and the
states. Id. at 33. The suggested reforms include: voluntary guidelines for judicial
campaign speech, campaign monitoring committees, compacts with the media to report
fairly on judicial candidate records and the issues of judicial campaigns, and third-party
organizations who can defend those judicial candidates unfairly attacked during a
campaign. Id. at 33-38. See generally Geyh, supra note 136, at 167 (comparing the federal
and state systems of selection to determine which, if either, best meets the balance
between accountability in a democratic government and independence).
148. See Knutson, supra note 138, at 202-07 (discussing the arguments for and against
the merit system).
149. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. at 787-88 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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V. CONCLUSION
State judges, regardless of their intentions, are forced to enter the
political arena as candidates in popular elections. It runs against the
democratic principles of this nation to suggest that the electorate can
make an informed decision while at the same time limiting the
information they receive from candidates.' 51 These fundamental
elements of democracy conflict with the ideal of impartiality that lies at
the foundation of the American judiciary.'1 2 Therefore, in an effort to
balance the voters' right to be informed, the candidates' right to speak,
and the citizens' interest in an impartial and unbiased judiciary, most
states employ limitations on judicial candidate speech.'53 The Supreme
Court objected to this attempt to balance the rights of citizens with the
interests of the states.5 4 Unfortunately, the Court has not solved the
problem nor provided adequate guidance as to which method would best
serve the competing interests."' Rather, the state courts and judicial
candidates are now responsible for blindly feeling their way through the
remaining speech restrictions, which continue to separate judicial
candidates from candidates for executive or legislative office.
150. See id. at 788-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Behrens & Silverman, supra note 2,
at 277-96 (outlining the serious dilemmas created by judicial elections).
151. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental purpose
of the First Amendment's strict protection of political speech as providing the electorate
with open access to candidate information so that they might make an informed decision).
152. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (asserting the intention of the
founders to create a government in which the judicial branch interpreted the law
independent of the popular will).
153. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (pointing to the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct and the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct as examples of the efforts
to limit the political influence over judicial elections).
154. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that
the Minnesota announce clause violated the First Amendment).
155. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's decision and
finding a lack of guidance from the Court as to permissible limitations on speech in a
judicial election state and on the issue of which selection system properly meets the
balance of all parties' interests).
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